INTRODUCTION.
Ecuador and Bolivia are the only Andean Community countries without competition legislation. Different reasons explain this situation. Although several initiatives have tried in the lasts decade to provide these countries with competition laws, with lots of resources poured on the process by the respective governments and by donor foreign countries and international organizations, no success has been reached so far. Political instability and institutional weaknesses are the main explanations behind that outcome 2 . Lack of consciousness regarding the virtues of a competitive market, small size of markets and widespread poverty are other factors that have helped so far to the blockade of all the drafts of competition laws so far.
THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY COMPETITION RULES.
The Andean Community (CAN) was born in 1969 as a Regional Trade Area (RTA) initially comprising the South American countries of Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia.
Venezuela entered the agreement in 1973, and Chile withdrew in 1976. Lately, the 22 nd of April 2006 Venezuela has announced its withdrawal, although formal requirements may delay its effectiveness some time. The CAN was originally conceived as a free trade area, a Customs Union, with a common external tariff and a common external trade policy specially regarding foreign investments 3 . Over the years the functioning of the CAN has been rather groggy, never fulfilling its economic integration aims, but it has some vigorous and strong institutions, which had proved their effectiveness in some of the matters of their competence 4 . The founding charter of the Andean Community -The Cartagena Agreement (1969) 5 -contains some references to the necessity of adopting rules against anticompetitive agreements and practices within the RTA 6 . In theory, the Secretary General was enabled to fight all anticompetitive business practices that may damage the functioning of Andean common market 7 .
Soft competition rules (1971-2005).
For many years existing antitrust rules in Andean Community Law lacked any effectiveness, as they consisted of simple recommendations or mere declaratory rules without teeth 8 . That was the situation with Commission's Decision 45 (adopted 18 December 1971), Commission's Decision 230 (adopted 11 December 1987 9 ) and finally Commission's Decision 285, 21 march 1991 (containing rules to prevent or correct the distortions in competition raised by restrictive practices of free competition 10 ). Due to the defects in the design of competition rules and lack of sanctioning powers by Andean institutions in charge of applying them, no major anticompetitive practices introduced by the member state governments or by business firms were detected or sanctioned during that time 11 .
Hard competition rules (from 2005).
Lately, Andean Commission Decision 608 of 29 March 2005, adopts the rules to protect and promote free competition in the Andean Community 12 . This Decision forbids agreements and business collusion that restricts competition and abuse of dominant position by firms that may affect trade among member States 13 . Decision 608 limits its scope of application to conducts restricting competition that affect business activities among member states in the Andean Community. It applies to those practices that take place in the territory of one or more member states and produce real effects in one or more member states, or those that take place in the territory of a non-member State and whose real effects are felt in one or more member States.
Practices with origin and effects in a single member State are excluded from its scope of application 14 . This rule is in force and, differently from its predecessor, it authorizes the General Secretary to impose heavy sanctions for the violations of the Decision's prohibitions 15 .
However, the prospects of the new rule should not be exaggerated, the poor experience with the Andean Community antitrust rules enacted before Decision 608 is inherited, and it is not easy to foresee where will its enforcement lead and what the effectiveness of Decision 608 will be. Apart from the weaknesses of the Andean Community itself, and the lack of resources of the Secretary General (which is the institution in charge of enforcing the rule) that may hinder application of Decision 608, there is considerable asymmetry in the member states on how widespread competition culture is in their economic systems and laws 16 .
DOWNLOADING ANDEAN RULES IN NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM.
Decision 608 has been praised due to its technical quality, inspired in EC competition Law. It sets a simple but effective framework to further economic integration and competition in the Andean Community markets. Moreover, it will undoubtedly affect domestic competition law and policy of member states, not only because it provides a powerful complement against anticompetitive practices affecting trade among member states but also because it may influence the way national rules are enforced, and even lead to a modification of national rules 17 .
One of the singularities of system enacted by Decision 608 explain this article and its title:
Andean Competition Rules recognize the power of Bolivia and Ecuador to apply them in their
Latinoamericano de Competencia 20 (junio 2005) 44-53. Some criticism in Gabriel IBARRA PARDO, "Análisis de la Decisión 608 en el estado actual de la Comunidad Andina de Naciones", mimeo 2006. 14 Article 5 of Decision 608. See Javier CORTÁZAR MORA, "Decisión 608 de la comunidad andina: un paso adelante para el sistema antimonopolios de la región", Rev. Derecho de la Competencia, CEDEC VI, Vol. 2 n° 2 (jan.-dec. 2006) 127-131, who underlines how the interpretation of the "effects clause" (which, at the end, is mirrored on EC antitrust law) is key in the future and credibility of the rule. 15 Article 34 establishes the fines applicable to violations of the prohibitions (with the cap of 10% of the value of total gross income of the violator in the previous year). 16 Ranging from countries familiar to competition law like Peru and Venezuela, to countries like Colombia, which does not share that familiarity. In other supranational systems, allegedly the European Union, the law has enabled Member States' institutions to apply EC competition rules but only when the conducts at issue had 18 The idea behind that option is to give Ecuador and Bolivia the possibility to overcome the impasse in their adoption of competition legal rules at state level. Initially, the idea of allowing them to use supranational rules provisionally until they adopt national rules seems to be a good one. In the short time it circumvents the impediments and obstacles to adoption of antitrust rules and it may help in propagating market competition culture. On a more long term perspective, one may tend to think it may put pressure on national legislators that may speed the adoption of national competition rules.
On the other hand, it may even help the implementation of the Decision 608 itself at the supranational level, spreading knowledge about this rule and about the sanctions that may be imposed for anticompetitive practices in trade among Andean member States.
However, the download may also be problematic, it may cause distortions at the national level, due to difficulties in implementing the rule, and it may also endanger the enforcement of Decision 608 at the Andean level.
Further problems may arise due to the fact that Decision 608 provides a framework of competition rules for a RTA and it is undoubtedly concerned with other aims apart from promoting free competition to benefit consumers and efficient firms in markets. Indeed, as it clearly sets in its preamble, it is also aimed at furthering economic integration and free trade among member states of the Andean Community. Interpretations of Decision 608 will have that in mind, and if used within the download process, should also remember that.
The "Download" in practice.
Decision 608 requires Ecuador and Bolivia to designate the national authority which will be in charge of applying the rule at the state level. Identification of the local authority or authorities which will be responsible for implementing the Andean rule domestically is key to monitor incidences in the download process. Mandatory member state designation is aimed at preventing potential distortions due conflicts among different national authorities that may voluntarily decide to implement the rule at the national level.
Apart from the problems of identifying the institutions that operate as transfer points for the download process. Other difficulties may arise in the download or transfer process. Like with computers, lack of system compatibility may impede the download to operate at all ( § 3.3.1).
Interferences with other national rules affecting competition may not only harden the application of Decision 608 at the national level ( § 3.3.2), but also endanger the credibility of the Andean competition rules themselves ( § 3.3.3) and severely damage the prospects for the adoption national competition rules ( § 3.3.4). 23 The self-attribution by CONATEL of the power to draft rules to make Decision 608 applicable in Ecuador was questioned due to lack of legislative empowerment. The same argument applies to the sanctioning powers attributed to the Super-agency of Telecommunications. 24 See Proyecto de reglamento de aplicación de las normas para proteger y promover la libre competencia en el sector de las telecomunicaciones, undated (made public on 31 st Jan 2006). A public discussion process was opened twice since the draft was first made public, and a motivation of the regulation was prepared (to placate some of the complaints against the draft) and made public in may 2006 download to take place and may aggravate the difficulties for other initiatives aimed at providing Ecuador with a general competition law.
Ecuador: "Download by an

Bolivia: "The European way of Download".
The Vice-ministry of Industry, Commerce and Exports was designed as the institution in charge of applying Decision 608 at the national level in Bolivia. Afterwards, a complete and exhaustive regulatory framework was drafted, with would create a national council for the defense and 
Why the "download" may not function or there may be interferences.
So far, the transfer of the Andean Competition Rules to the Bolivian and Ecuadorian national laws is an unconcluded process. The downloading initiatives are in progress, and only drafts of the regulations have been prepared. However, the initiatives detailed above ( §3.2.1 and §3.2.2) relate some of the problems that will be faced by the transfer process. Some of the problems have to do with the contents of the rules transferred themselves, others with the national institutions that have to apply the rules once downloaded. And yet, others have to do with the background in which downloaded rules have to root.
Lack of system compatibility.
Download may be difficult if national legal system contains singularities that impede some of the Andean rules to fit in it (for example, when there may be a contradiction between them).
However, if this problem arises, it will likely be solved through the use of the provisions in Andean Community Law that oblige member states not to adopt rules that contradict or go against the aims of the organization or of Andean Community Law 30 .
Conflicts or interferences with other national rules and institutions affecting competition.
This problem is related to the previous one, lack of competition law and policy in Ecuador and Bolivia does not mean they do not have rules and institutions that affect competition, specially related to regulated industries 31 . Moreover, the State plays a relevant role in economic activities and interferes in market functioning through several policies.
Some of the national rules contradicting the downloaded Andean competition rules will undoubtedly be modified and adapted, but problems may arise in coordinating the new framework with the former ones. Of course, this problem is also faced by other nations in which competition rules are also included in industry regulatory frameworks, and it is not peculiar to Ecuador or Bolivia.
For example, in Bolivia, the SIRESE Supreme Agencies (Sistema de Regulación Sectorial) will be in charge of investigating practices that may constitute a violation of Decision 608 which are also a violation of the Law 1600, of 28 October 1994 (Law SIRESE), which they are in charge of applying 32 . Apart from the obvious conflict of interest and lack of independence, this makes easy to confuse competition and regulatory policies, which are aimed at different tasks and objectives 33 .
Risking credibility of Andean competition rules
The Andean Community has never had a powerful competition regime, Decision 608 provides an instrument to correct that shortcoming. The implementation of this rule is a challenge for the Andean Community due to lack of experience and possible problems faced in its enforcement.
One of the difficulties that may be faced is related to the lack of a widespread market competition culture, and Andean Community institutions and national authorities will have to devote resources to change that 34 .
The download experience may harden the job for Andean institutions and for national authorities, 
Dangers for prospects of adopting a national competition rule.
Finally, downloading competition rules from the Andean setting faces the typical problem of "entering through the window what did not pass by the door". If the national background has been unapt for the implant of a competition law, there may be powerful explanations behind that outcome. In a sense, getting the competition law through the download process allows to overcome some of the political or institutional problems that have succeed so far in preventing Ecuador and Bolivia to have competition laws. However, the problems will undoubtedly appear in a different manner or shape later on, when identifying the institutions in charge of the implementation of the downloaded rules, drafting the national application procedures and in enforcement activities themselves. If the explanations behind the impossibility of adopting national competition rules to date were related to the institutional weakness and the lack of market and competition consciousness 35 , the same problems will arise -though with a slightly different flavor-when the download starts. For example, institutional weakness explains the difficulty encountered in the identifying the organs in charge of applying the national competition rules (be them nationally designed or downloaded from Andean Community Law), Ecuador shows the problems of a "volunteering organ" (i.e., CONATEL) while Bolivia represents better a compromise among all possible interested institutions, although the final solution may be to complex.
In this sense, problems faced with the download alternative may make more problematic the prospects for the design and installation of a national competition law . However, if the download is successful, presumably this may help in the adoption of national rules.
CONCLUSION.
This paper has analyzed the possibility provided by new competition rules in the Andean Community to be used as national competition rules by Ecuador or Bolivia. These are the only two members of the Andean Community without national competition law. The download alternative provides an interesting way of overcoming the impasse of national initiatives aimed at installing competition law s and policies on these two countries, but they are not free of problems.
The clever shortcut provided by the download faces many challenges and difficulties as the experience relates in Ecuador and Bolivia to date.
